We provide evidence that firms reprice out-of-the-money executive stock options in order to realign managerial incentives. A sharp decline in stock price, by reducing the sensitivity of executive pay to firm performance (delta) and, in many cases, increasing sensitivity of executive pay to stock-return volatility (vega), can cause managerial incentives to depart from optimal or target levels. Our results suggest that increasing delta does not appear to be a strong motivation for repricing. Rather, we find strong evidence that firms reprice executive options to reduce risk-taking incentives (vega) toward target levels.
Introduction
The practice of re-setting the exercise price of employee stock options has attracted considerable criticism from institutional investors and the popular press. Critics contend that option repricing is symptomatic of agency problems in the firm. Since repricing typically follows a period of poor stock-price performance, the claim is that managers in fact are being rewarded for performing poorly. Repricing firms, on the other hand, claim that they do so in order to retain valuable members of the management team and to restore managerial incentives following stock price declines. While these explanations for repricing are not mutually exclusive, the evidence we provide in this study is consistent with the notion that repricing represents, at least in part, an attempt to realign managerial incentives, particularly the managerial incentive to take risk.
The use of equity-based compensation, in the form of stock and options, has exploded in recent years (Murphy, 1999, and Perry and Zenner, 2000) . One effect has been a substantial increase in the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price (compare Hall and Liebman, 1998, to Jensen and Murphy, 1990) . The sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price, or delta, is seen as aligning the incentives of managers with the interests of shareholders. Higher delta can mean that managers will work harder or more effectively because managers share gains and losses with shareholders (Murphy, 1999) . Of course, another effect of increased delta is to expose managers to more risk. To the extent that managers are relatively undiversified with respect to firm-specific wealth, they are more risk averse compared to diversified shareholders. Accordingly, it is possible that managers will forego some positive-NPV projects if those projects are very risky (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985) . A second aspect of the increase in equity-based compensation potentially offsets this tendency. Associated with the increase in option grants and holdings has been an increase in the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock-return volatility, or vega. Option compensation, by providing convex payoffs, potentially can reduce aversion to risky value-increasing choices.
1 Recent empirical evidence supports this notion. For example, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2003) find that higher vega implements riskier financial and investment policy choices, including relatively more investment in R&D, less investment in tangible assets, more focus on fewer lines of business, higher leverage, and higher volatility of stock returns.
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In the absence of significant impediments to contracting, shareholders can structure the managerial compensation scheme to furnish managers with valuemaximizing delta and vega. But a change in stock price and/or changes in firm characteristics can cause both delta and vega to depart from their target values. For instance, given that options typically are granted at the money (Murphy, 1999) , and supposing that new stock and option grants are issued to bring managerial incentives closer to their target or optimal levels (Core and Guay, 1999; Li, 2002) , a stock-price decline subsequent to a grant could move incentives away from their target levels.
Several studies have argued that vega, or risk-taking incentives, increase when options go 1 Numerous papers have argued that convex payoffs can mitigate the effect of CEO risk aversion and provide the CEO with increased incentives to take on risky projects. For example, see Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Myers (1977) , Haugen and Senbet (1981) , Smith and Stulz (1985) , Smith and Watts (1992) , Gaver and Gaver (1993) , Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993) , and Guay (1999) . Despite the intuitive appeal of this argument, its validity depends on the managerial utility function. As illustrated in Guay (1999) , convexity of the payoff structure (e.g., from options) can be more than offset by concavity of the utility function of the risk-averse manager. Along the same lines, see Ju, Leland, and Senbet (2002) and Ross (2003) . Braido and Ferreira (2003) demonstrate that under certain conditions a call option could be written that makes all managers prefer riskier projects.
2 Also see Cohen, Hall, and Viceira (2000) , Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) , Knopf, Nam, and Thornton (2002) , and Rogers (2002). underwater. 3 Delta, on the other hand, declines when options go underwater, although Jin and Muelbrook (2002) show that the decline need not be substantial. Alternatively, the optimal or target level of incentives itself could change. This could happen, for instance, if any of the firm characteristics that affect incentives change, such as firms' investment opportunities. 4 In either case, managerial incentives deviate from their ideal level.
How might firms return delta and/or vega to target levels? Core and Guay (1999, p. 150) , in reference to pay-performance sensitivity, or delta, find "…firms use annual grants of options and restricted stock to CEOs to manage the optimal level of equity incentives." 5 Li (2002) provides complementary evidence that, on average, the firm, through equity and option grants, and the CEO, through portfolio rebalancing, jointly manage delta towards a target level.
Resetting the strike price of executive options is another possible strategy. For example, Acharya, John, and Sundaram (2000) and Hall and Murphy (2000) suggest that resetting executive options could be a suitable way to increase delta. Panel A of Figure 1 shows how option delta increases when the strike price is reset to a lower level while holding stock price constant (thereby increasing the price-to-strike ratio). Of course, the firm also can increase delta by granting the executive new options or stock, so repricing and any associated negative publicity would be unnecessary.
On the other hand, it can be more difficult to reduce vega should it be desirable to do so. An executive, by exercising options, can reduce vega (and increase delta), but this may not be feasible following a stock price decline as the options are likely to be out-ofthe-money. And even if the executive has in-the-money options, the board cannot force him to exercise such options. In many instances, therefore, repricing may be the most immediately viable mechanism to reduce vega. Along these lines, Li (2002) , as well as Gilson and Vetusypens (1993) and Carpenter (2000) , suggest that repricing following poor stock performance can reduce excessive risk-taking incentives. Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates this point. The figure shows how vega changes with strike price holding stock price constant. Prior to repricing, the price-to-strike ratio is typically around 0.45 (Carter and Lynch, 2001 ). Immediately after repricing, the price-to-strike ratio is typically 1.0.
The downward adjustment of strike price associated with repricing increases the price-tostrike ratio and reduces vega unless price-to-strike is extremely low (see Panel B).
We examine whether firms reprice employee options in order to manage target managerial incentives. In particular, following all Execucomp firms over the period 1992-2000, we examine CEO option repricing with explicit consideration of whether it is done in response to a departure of managerial delta and vega from target levels. We adopt a modified version of Core and Guay (2002) methodology to estimate actual CEO incentives, and follow the approach of Core and Guay (1999) to model target incentives.
The original Core and Guay (2002) methodology has one potential limitation in that the average exercise price is understated in the presence of out-of-the-money options.
This is an important consideration given that repricers will have underwater options. Our modified approach (discussed in detail in Section 3) provides us more precise estimates of option-moneyness and managerial incentives.
To model target (or optimal) delta and vega, we follow Core and Guay (1999) and Guay (1999) , and use the residuals from the model to measure the departure from target levels. A positive (negative) residual implies that the incentive measure is higher (lower) than the target level.
Our central result is that the propensity to reprice employee options is positively related to the vega residual. In contrast, there appears to be very little evidence that the propensity to reprice is negatively related to the delta residual. In our data, repricing is more likely when vega exceeds the target level, but a departure of delta from the target level has essentially no explanatory power. Various alternative explanations have been offered in the literature for repricing, such as rent extraction and agency problems, employee retention, and repricing as a mechanism for compensating executives in cashconstrained firms. Our results hold even after controlling for these alternative explanations. Thus, our evidence suggests that repricing represents, at least in part, an attempt to realign managerial incentives, specifically the incentive to implement risky policies.
These results contribute to the literature in several ways. First, our evidence suggests that repricing is part of the firm's overall compensation policy. Our results complement research that suggests firms manage executive incentives in a rational manner (Core and Guay, 1999; Li, 2002) . Second, by considering delta and vega separately instead of option-moneyness (as in Carter and Lynch, 2001), we isolate the specific dimension of incentive realignment that motivates repricing. Third, in contrast to Rogers (2003) , we consider the deviation from target incentives rather than the level of incentives. Rogers (2003) provides weak evidence that repricing is more likely in highvega firms. Our results suggest that it is the deviation from target incentives that drives repricing. In particular, even after controlling for the target levels of incentives, we find that the probability of repricing is positively related to the deviation from target vega.
Fourth, while equity and option grants appear to be given to move delta toward a target level (Core and Guay, 1999) , the propensity to reprice does not appear to be related to the deviation from target delta. One possible explanation resides in Jin and Muelbrook (2001) . They find that delta does not decrease much even for significant declines in stock price and, thus, there is little need to reprice options in order to increase delta. Finally, our sample size of over 4700 firm-year observations is quite large and represents many industries. In comparison, the only other study to consider both risk-taking incentives and repricing, Rogers (2003) , uses a sample of 26 casinos.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides additional discussion of the repricing literature and our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 details the methodology to estimate the deviations from target level of vega and target level of delta. Section 5 discusses our main results. Section 6 shows the results are robust to various alternative specifications. Section 7 concludes.
Discussion of the Literature, Hypotheses, and Methods
Potential reasons for repricing employee stock options include rent extraction, employee retention, information signaling, and incentive realignment. Among others, Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (2000) , Chance, Kumar, and Todd (2000) , Carter and Lynch (2001 , 2003a ), Grein, Hand, and Klassen (2003 ), Callaghan, Saly, and Subramaniam (2003a ), and Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003a Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003a) compare CEO incentive packages across firms that include the CEO in the repricing versus those that do not. They find that, in firms that exclude the CEO in the repricing, the CEO's portfolio contains relatively more 6 The methods employed in these papers and others include event studies (e.g., of repricing or turnover), cross-sectional regression of event abnormal returns on firm characteristics, estimation of the repricing wealth transfer from shareholders to executives, and qualitative response models of the propensity to reprice or likelihood of turnover. Right-hand side variables include moneyness of employee options, prior stock returns, board structure, leadership structure, ownership structure, other governance characteristics, proxies for agency problems, and turnover probability. stock than options. Chidambaran and Prabhala interpret this result as weak evidence that incentive realignment plays a role in repricing.
On the other hand, Jin and Muelbrook (2001) find that delta decreases only marginally even for significant declines in stock price. In reference to delta, they conclude that "…restoring incentive-alignment is seldom a good justification for resetting the stock price or issuing new option grants." Chakraborty, Sheikh, and Subramanian (2003) find evidence consistent with this proposition. In their sample, the potential increase in delta based on a repricing has little power to explain the probability that a firm actually does reprice employee options. Similarly, Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003b) find that changes in delta following repricing appear small.
Finally, to our knowledge, Rogers (2003) is the only other paper that attempts to link the repricing decision to risk-taking incentives, but his study has several limitations.
First, Rogers, using executive-level regressions, finds no relation between the repricing decision and the ratio of vega-to-delta. When he measures risk-taking incentives as either the ratio of the vega-to-cash-compensation, or as the product of vega-to-delta ratio and vega-to-cash-compensation ratio, he finds a positive relation between the repricing decision and his measures of risk-taking incentives. 7 Thus the Rogers (2003) model considers the level of (scaled) incentives as being the primary determinant of repricing.
We argue, however, that the level of incentives is not important when firms make repricing decisions; it is the deviation from target incentives that is more important.
Second, the level of incentives as used by Rogers could merely be proxying for some 7 In this paper, we examine whether repricing is a response to misalignment of incentives provided by the compensation contract. Our methodology for estimating deviations from target incentives is similar to that of Core and Guay (1999) . First, we use data on the manager's entire portfolio of stock and options to obtain a comprehensive measure of the incentives faced by managers. Specifically, we estimate vega and delta using a refinement to the methodology suggested by Core and Guay (2002) to account for underwater options. Delta is the sensitivity of the executive's wealth to stock price and captures the managerial incentive to increase stock price. Vega is the sensitivity of the executive's wealth to stock volatility and captures the managerial incentive to take risks.
Second, we estimate separate cross-sectional regressions for each of delta and vega, where the independent variables are firm and CEO characteristics identified in the literature as important determinants of these incentives. Our regression specifications are similar to Core and Guay (1999) and Guay (1999) . Third, from these regressions, we obtain the predicted values of delta and vega for the CEO, which proxy for "optimal" or target incentives for the CEO (Core and Guay, 1999) . The residuals from these regressions, in each case the actual value of the incentive measure minus the predicted level, provide an estimate of the extent to which the CEO's delta and vega are misaligned.
A positive (negative) residual implies that the CEO has incentives that are above (below) target levels. Both option repricing and additional option and equity grants can increase delta to the target level. Therefore, the probability of repricing should be negativelyrelated to the lagged departure from target delta. If vega is too low, then additional option grants can increase vega, but if vega is too high, option repricing is likely to be the most viable mechanism for correcting the misalignment of risk-taking incentives. Thus, the propensity to reprice should be positively related to the lagged departure from target vega.
In the following analysis, our specification and results suggest that it is residual vega, rather than residual delta, that has significant power to explain the repricing decision. Repricing appears to mitigate excessive risk-taking incentives.
Data description and summary statistics
We use We verify the Execucomp information using firms' proxy statements (from Lexis-Nexis).
Execucomp indicates the dates when the CEO assumed office and when the CEO quit office. In some cases, Execucomp fails to identify an executive as the CEO even though he or she appears to be the CEO based on these dates. We classify these individuals also as CEOs. Execucomp also indicates whether a firm reprices stock options in a given year.
We then rely on the proxy statements to identify whether it is the CEO's options that were repriced in a given year and, if so, we classify these observations as repricers. All others are classified as non-repricers. Consistent with the prior literature, we eliminate finance firms and utility firms. We obtain other firm-specific information from
Compustat and stock return information from CRSP.
Modification of Core and Guay(2002) methodology to compute incentives
Our methodology to calculate delta and vega is based on a modified version of Core and Guay (2002) . Core and Guay (2002) suggest a one-year approximation method for calculating incentives. Using this method, the vega and delta for the executive's entire portfolio of stock and options can be estimated using aggregated data from the most recent year's proxy. They find that delta and vega calculated using their method has a 99% correlation with the true underlying values.
One potential limitation of their methodology (as the authors themselves point out)
is that the average exercise price is understated in the presence of out-of-the-money options. While this may be an important consideration in any study of repricing, given that repricers will have underwater options, its impact on our study is limited for the following reasons. First, Core and Guay suggest that the extent of the bias is less important if the study deals with cross-sectional variation in incentives, rather than focusing on magnitude of incentives (page 624). Since, in our study, we are interested in the cross-sectional variation in incentives, the potential for bias is offset to a large extent.
Second, they suggest that controlling for the observed price-to-strike ratio in the regression will reduce the extent of the bias. Our results are robust to including price-tostrike ratio as an additional control variable. Finally, in our study, we are interested in deviation from target incentives (measured as actual minus target incentives), and it is not clear that this is biased even if the actual incentives themselves are biased.
Nevertheless, to remove any potential for bias, we refine the Core and Guay (2002) approach using a methodology similar to that suggested in their paper (page 624).
Specifically, we use data on option grants awarded in the most recent three years to more precisely estimate the average exercise price. The advantage of this method is that we know the exact strike price for options granted in the last three years. In the original Core and Guay method, exact strike price is known only for grants in the most recent year, and the strike price for the portfolio of remaining options is inferred from the proxy data. In doing so, their method assumes strike price equals market price for any underwater options in the portfolio. Since we use three years of option-grant data, we know the exact strike price for these three years, and we only have to infer the strike price for any remaining option holdings. 8 This minimizes the error in estimating the strike price and hence the incentives.
Incentives calculated using our method have an over 95% correlation with that calculated using the original Core and Guay (2002) method. This correlation is the same for both repricers and non-repricers. While all our results are based on modified incentives, they are robust to using the original Core and Guay (2002) method. This is not surprising given the high correlation between incentives computed using the two methods.
A complete discussion of our methodology is provided in Appendix 1. 9 We define delta as the change in the dollar value of the CEO's wealth for a one percentage point change in stock price and vega as the change in dollar value of the CEO's wealth for a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns. From Table 2 it can be seen that compared to non-repricers, in the year prior to repricing, repricers tend to be significantly smaller (median sales of repricers is $333 million versus $877 million for non-repricers) and more volatile (median standard deviation of daily returns is 3.53% versus 2.38%). The ratio of R&D expense to assets is higher for repricers (median = 5.9%) than non-repricers (median = 0.3%). This is consistent with the finding of Carter and Lynch (2001) that repricers tend to operate in high-tech industries. Repricers also tend to exhibit poorer performance in the year prior to repricing; the median lagged ROA of repricers is 11.8% compared to 15.2% for nonrepricers and the median lagged stock returns are -14.9% for repricers compared to 14.1% for non-repricers. The median lagged industry-adjusted performance measures are also significantly lower for repricers compared to non-repricers. These results are consistent with the prior studies on repricing mentioned above.
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics

Determinants of target vega and target delta
Our main hypothesis is that repricing serves to realign incentives. To estimate the magnitude of incentive misalignment, we follow Core and Guay (1999) .
Estimating target delta
We regress delta on firm and CEO characteristics and use the predicted value as the proxy for the target level of delta for each firm-year observation. We report robust tstatistics in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. Our explanatory variables are based on Core and Guay (1999) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2003) and the results are generally similar to these papers. 11 In our sample, delta is positively related to firm size and to market-to-book, a commonly used proxy for growth opportunities. Delta is positively related to CAPEX, and negatively related to R&D and leverage. This is consistent with the evidence in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2003), who find that delta is related inversely to riskiness of policy choices. We find a 11 See Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , Smith and Watts (1992) , Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993) , Gaver and Gaver (1993) , Mehran (1995) , Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) , Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) , Palia (2001) , Baker and Hall (2002) , and Core and Guay (2002) for additional studies on the determinants of delta.
positive relation between delta and the volatility of stock returns, which is consistent with firms with greater difficulty in monitoring being given higher delta (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) . Finally, we find that delta increases in CEO tenure, which is consistent with greater accumulation of stock and options by CEOs and mitigation of horizon problems (see Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Brickley, Coles, and Linck, 1999) .
The residual from the above regression gives the deviation from target delta.
Estimating target vega
To estimate target vega, we estimate a regression specification similar to those in Guay (1999) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2003) . Again, our results are generally similar to both these papers. Our regression results are reported below with robust tstatistics given in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. Guay (1999) argues that vega should be higher in firms with high growth opportunities so as to provide risk-averse managers incentives to undertake risky but positive-NPV projects. Consistent with this, we find that vega is positively related to market-to-book. Vega is positively related to riskier policy choices such as R&D and leverage as in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2003) . Vega increases in firm size, as in Guay (1999) and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2003) . Consistent with the latter paper, we also find that vega increases with cash compensation and with volatility.
The residual from this equation gives the deviation from target vega.
Results on repricing decisions and incentive alignment
In this section, we provide detailed evidence on the role of repricing in realigning managerial incentives. A positive (negative) residual from either the delta or the vega regression implies that the CEO has higher (lower) than target incentives. As we outline in Section 1, if the CEO's risk-taking incentives, or vega, is below target, then it is easy to increase it by providing more stock options. On the other hand, if the CEO's vega is above target, then repricing is one of the few viable mechanisms by which vega can be reduced. In this case, we would expect the probability of repricing to be positively related to the vega residual as of the beginning of the year. Similarly, a negative residual from the delta regression indicates that the sensitivity of CEO wealth to shareholder value (delta) is lower than target levels. Repricing is one of many mechanisms by which firms can increase delta. If an important motivation for repricing is to increase delta, we would expect the probability of repricing to be negatively related to the delta residual as of the beginning of the year. Table 3 presents the summary statistics for CEO incentives around the repricing event (year 0). An examination of Table 3 indicates that in the two years prior to repricing, unadjusted vega for repricers is lower than for non-repricers. Also, vega continues to increase after repricing for both repricers and non-repricers. These results are inconsistent with Rogers (2003) . Residual vega (deviation from target vega), however, is positive and significantly higher (p < 0.01) for repricers compared to nonrepricers in the year prior to repricing. The residual vega for repricers in the year prior to repricing is $17,419 which also appears to be economically significant relative to average vega ($49,343) . In the year after repricing, residual vega decreases to -$2,571 and is not significantly different (p = 0.73) from the residual vega for non-repricers. These univariate results are consistent with our hypothesis that excess vega is associated with increased likelihood of repricing.
Incentives around repricing event
Residual delta of repricers is positive (higher than target) in the years prior to repricing and becomes negative subsequent to repricing. Moreover, the residual delta for repricers is not significantly different from that of non-repricers (p > 0.24) in any of the years. These findings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that firms reprice to increase delta towards its target level. Table 4 presents logistic regressions of the repricing decision. The dependent variable is one if the CEO's options are repriced in a given year, and zero otherwise. We use lagged values of both residual vega and residual delta as our primary explanatory variables. Model 1 includes only the two residual incentive variables, while Models 2 and 3 also include control variables that have previously been used to explain the probability of repricing. In all three models, we include 18 industry dummies, formed as in Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003a) , and also year dummies. 12 We use R&D to proxy for high-tech industries. 13 Also, Acharya, John, and Sundaram (2000) suggest that repricing is appropriate for firms when management can significantly affect the distribution of firm returns. Managers are likely to be more important in firms with large growth options. We use R&D and market-to-book as proxies. 14 Repricing is also more likely when the CEO has more power (Acharya, John, and Sundaram, 2000) . We use CEO tenure to proxy for CEO power.
Logistic regression results
In all three specifications, the parameter estimates on lagged residual vega are positive and significant at 5% or better (p = 0.002, p = 0.013, and p = 0.013, respectively).
This is consistent with our hypothesis that firms reprice in order to reduce excessive risktaking incentives. In contrast, in all three specifications, the coefficient on residual delta is negative but statistically insignificant at conventional levels. These results for both vega and delta are consistent with the univariate results tabulated in Table 3 .
In terms of economic significance, deviation from target vega appears to be an important determinant of the likelihood of repricing. For example, in the "computer and electronic parts" industry in 1998 (the industry and year with most repricings), an increase in residual vega from its 25 th to its 75 th percentile (keeping all other variables at their median values), increases the probability of repricing by 30% relative to the repricing probability of the median firm. Deviations from target delta, on the other hand, appear to be less important. For the same industry-year combination, an increase in the residual delta from its 25 th to its 75 th percentile decreases the probability of repricing by 12%.
13 Carter and Lynch (2001) use a "high-tech" dummy for firms that are included in the 1998 CorpTech Directory of Technology. They find that R&D for high-tech firms is significantly higher than for non-hightech firms. 14 Chance, Kumar, and Todd (2000) also use market-to-book in the logistic regression.
For the control variables, consistent with prior literature, we find that repricing is more likely in smaller firms, more volatile firms, and firms that have had poor stock returns in the past. The coefficient on market-to-book, CEO tenure, and R&D appear to have no explanatory power.
In summary, our primary result is that firms reprice to realign one important dimension of managerial incentives. In particular, the evidence suggests that firms reprice in order to reduce risk-taking incentives. In contrast, there is little evidence that firms reprice to realign pay-performance sensitivity.
Testing alternative explanations for repricing
Alternative explanations for repricing have been suggested in the literature. In
this section, we demonstrate that our results remain after controlling for these alternative explanations. Second, Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (1996) and Yermack (1995) suggest that firms may use stock and options as substitutes for cash compensation. Thus, cashconstrained firms may be more likely to reprice to adjust dollar compensation levels, rather than to align incentives. We therefore use CEO cash compensation as an additional control variable in Model 2. We find that the coefficient of cash compensation is not significantly related to the repricing decision. Rogers (2003) uses the level of vega (scaled by cash compensation, or by delta) as a proxy for risk-taking incentives. As we argue throughout our paper, it is the deviation from target incentives, and not the level of target incentives that is likely to affect the repricing decision. The (weakly) positive relation between vega and the repricing decision documented by Rogers could be due to his failure to control for market-to-book ratio in his regressions (which other studies such as Chance et al. (2000) have shown to be important). Vega, therefore, could be merely proxying for growth opportunities.
Nevertheless, in Model 3, we control for target vega and target delta (predicted values from individual regressions of vega and delta). We find that target delta is positively related to the probability of repricing, while target vega does not seem to impact repricing. We therefore include free cash flow and an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board as proxies for agency problems. The results are shown in Models 4 and 5. We find that neither of these variables is significantly related to repricing. An alternate proxy for agency problems in the firm is excess CEO compensation. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) find that CEOs are paid more in firms with poor governance structures. We therefore use excess total direct CEO compensation instead of free cash flow in the regressions (where total direct compensation is defined as the sum of salary, bonus, value of option grants, value of restricted stock grants, value of long-term incentive payouts, and all other annual compensation). Excess total direct compensation is the residual from a regression of total direct compensation on firm size, market-to-book, stock and accounting performance, CEO tenure and industry and year dummies. We find that the coefficient on excess CEO compensation is positively related to repricing, which suggests that repricing is more likely in firms with more agency problems, but the coefficient is not statistically significant (p = 0.25). The deviation from residual vega, however, continues to be statistically significant (p = 0.01).
Model 6 considers all of the above variables included in the same regression. As before we find firm age and target delta to be significantly related to repricing. In all models, the coefficient on the deviation from target vega continues to be statistically significant at 5% or better. This suggests that realigning risk-taking incentives is a significant determinant of the repricing decision. The coefficient on the deviation from target delta is always negative but has no explanatory power.
Results using matched sample of repricers
The regression results in Tables 4 and 5 While having underwater options, or having negative stock returns, appears to be a necessary condition for repricing, neither of these two events imply that the executive's vega has risen above or that delta has fallen below target levels. For instance, we find that the correlation between return in a given year and the change in residual vega during the year is only -9% while the correlation between returns and change in residual delta is only +8%. Nevertheless, we choose three different control samples based on the existing literature.
The first control sample consists of a subset of firms that have underwater options in the year prior to repricing. 15 The second control sample consists of a matched set of firms from the same industry, with a similar price decline in the year prior to repricing.
The third control sample consists of a matched set of firms, again from the same industry, where the CEO's option portfolio has a similar price-to-strike ratio in the year prior to repricing. Table 6 reports logistic regression results for the control samples described above. The first column in each Panel corresponds to the most comprehensive model of Panel A of Table 6 reports the logistic regression results using the subsample of non-repricers with underwater options. In Panel B, the match is based on lagged price-tostrike ratio and in Panel C, the match is based on lagged stock-return. The results in all six specifications indicate that the probability of repricing is significantly positively related (p ≤ 0.032) to the deviation from target vega. In contrast, we find that the 15 As mentioned earlier, we use the latest three years proxy data on option grants to compute incentives. We know the exact exercise prices of the option grants in each of these three years and hence are able to correctly identify whether any of these options are underwater. In the case of options granted prior to these three years which are still unexercised by the CEO, we are unable to identify whether they are underwater due to data limitations (see Appendix 1 for more details). Therefore every firm in our control sample has some underwater options, but not every firm with underwater options is included in the sample. coefficient on residual delta continues to be negative but is statistically significant only in Panel A. This result is (weakly) consistent with firms repricing to increase the delta towards target levels.
None of the control variables has significant explanatory power across all specifications. In three of six specifications, the coefficient on volatility is significantly positive while that on firm size is significantly negative. In two of the three specifications, the coefficient on target delta is significantly positive while that on firm age is significantly negative. These results are consistent with earlier tables.
In summary, our results based on matched control samples support our earlier conclusions that repricing is positively related to deviation from target vega but only weakly (at best) related to deviation from target delta.
Robustness
In this section we consider the robustness of the repricing results to alternative specifications for the logistic regression predicting repricing, and alternative specifications for target delta and vega.
Sensitivity of logit regressions of repricing decision to different specifications
We re-estimate the most comprehensive model of Table 4 (Model 3) and the most comprehensive model of Table 5 (Model 6) using various alternative specifications and/or additional control variables. We include the average price-to-strike ratio of the option portfolio in the year prior to repricing to capture moneyness of the option portfolio as in Carter and Lynch (2001) . Also, as discussed in Section 2, Core and Guay (2002) suggest that including the price-to-strike ratio will reduce the measurement error in incentives.
Also, instead of using logarithm of sales, we use different proxies for firm size, such as logarithm of book value of assets (Carter and Lynch, 2001) , logarithm of market value of equity (Chance, Kumar, and Todd, 2002) , and logarithm of market value of assets (Guay, 1999) . Instead of firm returns, we use the median industry return and the firm return net of median industry return (Carter and Lynch, 2001) . We also include logarithm of CEO age as a proxy for risk aversion (Guay, 1999) . Additionally, we use sales growth and change in ROA, both estimated over the previous two years (as in Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2003a) .
Of the control variables, alternative proxies for both firm size and returns are significantly negative, as documented in the literature. The coefficients on CEO age and sales growth are insignificant, while change in ROA is weakly negative.
In terms of the primary variables of interest, our main inferences are robust to these alternative specifications. As in Table 4 and Table 5 , the coefficient on residual vega is positive and statistically significant and the coefficient on residual delta is negative but statistically insignificant.
We use 2-digit SIC dummies rather than the 18 industry groups used by Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003a) . Because repricers are not present in all 2-digit SIC industries, we lose many observations. Further, we re-estimate the regression coefficients and the t-statistics for the logistic regression using a Fama-Macbeth approach. 16 Again, we lose observations when we do the regressions year-by-year, as required for this approach, since repricing firms are not present in all 18 industry groups in every year. 16 We estimate the deviations from optimal delta and optimal vega using annual regressions (instead of a pooled regression) so as to ensure the deviations sum to zero in each year.
All inferences concerning managerial incentive realignment remain unchanged except that residual delta comes in significantly negative in one specification.
Sensitivity of repricing results to alternative specifications of target delta and target vega regressions
We next consider the robustness of our results to alternative specifications of target delta and target vega and the calculation of the corresponding residual values. That is, we re-estimate the residuals from the alternative delta and vega equations discussed below. In the target delta regression, we use logarithm of market value of equity to proxy for size (instead of logarithm of sales), include logarithm of CEO age as an additional control, and use an alternative definition of free cash flow as in Core and Guay (1999) .
In the target vega equation, as in Guay (1999), we include free cash flow and an indicator variable for tax-loss-carry forwards to proxy for incentives to hedge. In all cases, our main inferences are the same.
We also use the same variables as in Core and Guay (1999) and Guay (1999) except that we use lagged values instead of 3-year averages in the case of free-cash-flow and unsystematic risk. 17 As in Baber, Janakiraman, and Kang (1996) , Gaver and Gaver (1993) , and Guay (1999) , we use factor analysis to construct a single variable -that is, a factor score which captures variation common to market-to-book ratio, R&D, and CAPEX. In addition, we use log(vega) instead of vega and log(delta) instead of delta as the dependent variables. We use the 18 industry dummies (as in Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2003a) in the target vega and target delta equations instead of 2-digit SIC dummies. Again, our results on residual vega and residual delta remain unaltered.
In sum, these results as well as the evidence presented in Sections 6.1 show that our inferences are robust to a wide variety of alternative specifications. Our empirical results provide strong evidence that firms reprice executive options in order to realign managerial incentives for risk-taking.
Conclusions
Potential motives for repricing include rent extraction, executive retention, information signaling, and incentive alignment. We follow the approach of Core and Guay (1999) to examine whether firms reprice employee options in order to manage optimal managerial incentives. In particular, the incentives we consider are the sensitivity of CEO wealth to firm performance (delta) and the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock-return volatility (vega). We compute delta and vega using a modification to the Core and Guay (2002) approach, which allows us to more precisely estimate incentives in the presence of underwater options.
Following all Execucomp firms over the period 1992-2000, we examine employee option repricing with explicit consideration of whether it is done in response to a departure of managerial delta and vega from target levels. As do Core and Guay (1999), we model target or optimal delta and vega for CEOs and use the residuals from the model to measure the departure from target levels.
Our central result is that the propensity to reprice employee options is positively related to the vega residual. This relation is both statistically and economically significant. This is consistent with the notion that repricing is done to reduce the managerial incentive to increase risk. In contrast, the coefficient on the delta residual tends to be negative but statistically insignificant. Repricing is more likely when vega exceeds the target level, but a departure of delta from the target level has little explanatory power. Our results remain after controlling for various alternative explanations for repricing such as employee retention and agency problems. Our evidence suggests that repricing represents, at least in part, an attempt to realign managerial incentives, particularly the incentive to take risk.
Appendix 1: Calculation of vega and delta measures
This appendix explains how the delta and vega measures used in this paper have been calculated. Our approach is based on a modification of the Core and Guay (2002) method for computing incentives. In the original Core and Guay method, exact strike price is known only for grants in the most recent year, as they use only the latest year's proxy data. The strike price for the portfolio of remaining options is inferred from aggregate data on holdings of exercisable and unexercisable options. In doing so, their method assumes strike price equals market price for any underwater options in the portfolio. Core and Guay (page 624) suggest a modified approach that helps address this issue. Our modification is in the same spirit as the approach suggested by Core and Guay.
Specifically, we use data on option grants awarded in the most recent three years to more precisely estimate the average exercise price. This involves examining 3 years of proxy data (rather than 1 year as in Core and Guay), but the advantage is that we know the exact strike price for options granted in the last three years. Thus, we have to infer the strike price only for any remaining option holdings. The choice of 3-year window is based on empirical research that shows that vesting period of a typical option is between two and three years (Huddart and Lang, 1996; Carpenter, 1998) . This method minimizes the error in estimating the strike price and hence the incentives. , 0 ( * For exercisable options, they assume the time to maturity is three years less than the time to maturity of the current year's option grants, or 6 years if no grant was made in the current year. For unexercisable options, they assume the time to maturity equal to one year less than the time to maturity of the current year's options grants, or 9 years if no grant was made in the current year. Other parameters (risk-free rate, volatility, dividend yield, and stock price) are as given in Execucomp.
We adopt a similar approach, but we use data on the latest three years of option grants instead of just the latest year. Computation of incentives is done as follows.
Case 1: If sum of option grants over the latest three years is less than or equal to the unvested holdings, then we compute the overall sensitivities as follows:
• Compute the sensitivities for each tranche separately.
• N is the number of options awarded in tranche i.
• Compute the sensitivities for vested portfolio as in Core and Guay (2002) • The total incentives from stock option holdings are the sum of the sensitivities calculated above.
Case 2: If sum of option grants over the latest three years is greater than the unvested holdings but less than or equal to the total holdings, then we compute the overall incentives as follows:
• Case 3: If sum of option grants over the latest three years is greater than the total holdings, we get the most precise estimates of incentives as they are computed entirely from the tranche level data. We first identify the chronological sequence of option grants made within a year. Option grants during the year could be done in many tranches. Since the date of option award is not given, for tranches made within a year, the tranche with the earliest exercise date is assumed to have been given first. We are thus able to identify the tranches which constitute the holdings of the CEO. The sensitivities are calculated separately for each tranche identified as being part of the CEO's holdings. Incentives from option holdings are then given by the sum of these sensitivities.
The above computation gives the incentives from options only, whereas we need the total incentives from stocks and options. For this, we first calculate the delta of the manager's portfolio of stocks and options by adding the delta of restricted stock and shares held by the CEO to the delta of his options portfolio. The delta of stock is the fractional shareholding x 0.01 x stock price. In the case of vega, we do not estimate the vega of restricted stock and shares separately because Guay (1999) finds that this value is insignificant compared to the vega from options.
The actual formulae used to calculate the option value, delta, and vega are based on Black and Scholes (1973) model for valuing European call options, as modified by Merton (1973) , to account for dividend payouts. Surplus cash = Cash from assets-in-place to total assets = (data308-data125+data46)/data6
Stock return = Annual return over the fiscal year
Free cash flow = Operating cash flow less equity and common dividends scaled by assets = (data308-data19-data21)/data6
Firm age = Log(number of years since first trade on CRSP)
Cash compensation = Sum of CEO's salary and bonus Table 6 Logit estimates of repricing decision: using various control samples Logit regressions are reported where the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the firm reprices in year 't'. Vega is the dollar change in the value of the CEO's stock and option portfolio for a 0.01 change in standard deviation of returns. Delta is the dollar change in the value of the CEO's stock and option portfolio for a 1% change in stock price. In Panel A, non-repricers include all those who have underwater options in the year prior to repricing. In Panel B, each repricing observation is matched with a non-repricer with the same weighted-average price-to-strike ratio as of the year prior to repricing. In Panel C, the match is based on stocks returns in the year prior to repricing. In the last two cases, the control sample is also restricted to be in the same industry as the repricer. 
